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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts have adequately been set forth in the Brief
of Appellants and in the responding Brief of William E.
Pitcher, Jr. and therefore additional discussion of facts
in this general section is unnecessary.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
ASSESS THE PARTNERSHIP ASSETS AS TO
THEIR MARKET VALUE AT THE TIME THE
PARTNERSHIP WAS DISSOLVED.

Respondent argues in his brief that it was Plaintiffs1
burden to prove the value of the assets and that therefore
the lower court was correct in determining that the equipment
had no value based solely upon the testimony of Defendants.
(Respondents1 Brief, pp. 8-9). This argument is deficient for
several reasons.
First, Plaintiff in his lawsuit was not attempting to
obtain a division of partnership assets since he contended
throughout the trial that no partnership existed.

His position

was that Mr. Pitcher was an employee of Plaintiff and therefore
all of the equipment and supplies belonged to the plaintiff.
•Under this theory of the case, therefore, it was unnecessary
for Plaintiff to prove any value of the assets since he believed
he was entitled to their complete return.
Second, since the lower court found that a partnership
agreement existed and since it was therefore incumbent upon the
court to divide the partnership assets the lower court could
only do so if there were competent evidence showing the value
of such property.

An examination of the transcript, however,

shows that neither party attempted to place a present value on
the equipment at the time the partnership was dissolved.
Respondent cites a transcript reference in which he was asked
by his attorney what the basis for the equipment was at the
time of termination.

The following dialogue between Mr.

Pitcher and his attorney concerns the tax basis of the equipment
not its value.

-9-

Q.

Your contract says that the purchase price
would be determined on the basis of cost of
equipment less depreciation plus inventory.
Are you familiar with that clause?

A.

Yes.

Q.

On December 31, 1978 what was the basis of
the equipment less depreciation?

A.

I would imagine from the figures that I have
come up with that it was somewhere around
$6,500 or $7,000.

Q.

Does that include deductions for depreciation?

A.

There's depreciation deducted. The equipment
was—by that time, six years, was all depreciated
out.

Q.

So if the contract says you take the cost of
equipment less depreciation what would this
figure be?

A.

Well, less depreciation cost of the equipment
would be zero.

Q.

All would be depreciated straight line by that
time?

A.

All be depreciated.

(Tr. pp. 189-190) .

Mr. Pitcher did not state that the equipment had no value.
Rather, he stated that the equipment had been depreciated in
terms of its taxable basis.
different.

The two are obviously quite

As noted in the earlier brief of Appellants,

had Mr. Pitcher sought specific performance of clause 8 of
the agreement then the depreciated cost of the equipment would
be the correct figure to utilize.

However, Mr. Pitcher chose

to terminate whatever agreement existed and to unilaterally
begin his own company.

(Tr. pp. 188-191).

It is therefore,

immaterial what the depreciated value of the equipment was at
the time of termination and the only material inquiry concerned

its market value.
Mr. Pitcher himself acknowledged that the original
equipment cost around $1,200 and that an additional $7,000
worth of equipment was purchased throughout the term of the
agreement.

(Tr. pp. 20,32-34).

Mr. Sather, on the other

hand, claimed that $6,500 worth of equipment existed when
the relationship began and did not know how much additional
equipment had been purchased during the pendency of the
agreement.

(Tr. pp. 146).

It also should be noted that under the terms of the
agreement it is stated that upon termination, "it is agreed
that an accounting in full shall be had between the parties
within three days after such termination."
Agreement).

(Paragraph 11 of

Mr. Pitcher failed to provide any sort of

accounting to the plaintiff as to all of the equipment and
inventory which he took and made a part of his own business.
Furthermore, since this equipment was in the possession of
Mr. Pitcher after the litigation began and since only Mr.
Pitcher would know what equipment came from the previous
agreement and what equipment was -purchased subsequently it
would be placing an unfair burden upon the plaintiff to
establish the market value of the equipment now maintained
in Defendant's company.
In any event, this is a case of equity and it will require
little effort for the lower court to determine the value, if
any, of the equipment which was taken from the partnership
business by Mr. Pitcher.

Further, this Court should instruct
-4-

the lower court not to consider the amount of depreciation
taken on this equipment since it is entirely irrelevant to
a partnership accounting.
For this reason, therefore, the matter should be remanded
to the lower court for further proceedings.
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN MATHEMATICAL
COMPUTATION OF PLAINTIFF'S OBLIGATION
FOR THE ALLEGED LOSS SUSTAINED BY THE
BUSINESS.
Plaintiff in his opening Brief raised a number of problems
as to the award by the lower court of $6,000 to Defendant for
reimbursement of alleged losses suffered in the business.
These problems include:
1. -An erroneous mathematical figure which is not based
upon the evidence;
2.

The error in the lower court's consideration of

Plaintiff's tax benefit;
3.

The lack of any evidence to show that these losses

were ever paid to creditors; and
4.

The failure of the lower court to order the assets of

the partnership sold before the individual partners were assessed
losses.

(Appellants' Brief, pp. 16-18).

Defendant in his Brief responds only to the first problem
area.

(Respondent's Brief, pp. 11-12).

Defendant argues that

the evidence showed that if anything Plaintiff owed a larger
sum of money to Defendant.

Again, however, plaintiff Sather

would dispute these calculations.

First, it appeared from the

evidence that the $9,888 loss included $4,946 of unpaid taxes.
Admittedly, the record is unclear as to this point but the
defendant's own testimony would seem to support this contention.
In a dialogue with his attorney Defendant stated:
Q.

According to your records the term of the
partnership shows approximately a total loss
of $9,800. Would that be correct?

A.

I believe. I didn't figure it up, but I believe
that would be about correct.

Q.

Did he share in any of that loss with you?

A.

No.

Q.

How did you cover that loss?

A.

Well, we just didn't pay a few bills for a while.
We got a little money and then we would pay the
bills. In fact, part of it was Internal Revenue
money that was taken to pay bills with, and it was
supposed to go to the Internal Revenue. (Tr. p. 56).

The $446.17 paid to the State for back taxes, again, out
of Defendant's own mouth, was paid from the business account
and therefore Defendant cannot receive a credit for this payment.
(Tr. p. 183). Thus, the original calculation made by Appellant
in his opening Brief are correct and at the most he should be
liable for $2,900 to the defendant for any business losses.
Defendant failed in his Brief to show any evidence where
these business losses had in fact been paid.

Respondents state,

"Mr. Pitcher had paid the entire operating loss" but the record
citation given only refers to the payment of State and Federal
taxes.

Before Defendant can make a claim for reimbursement of

operating losses he must prove that he actually paid such losses
since otherwise Plaintiff could pay the same debts twice.
-6-

Next, Defendant states that the interest owed to him is
well over $2,700 and therefore he should not complain about
the judgment.

Again, there is no specific finding as to what

interest the court is referring to or what amount such interest
is based upon.

Respondent fails to address the counter-considera-

tion of the lower court in penalizing Plaintiff for the tax
deduction he claimed from the business loss.

Basically, the

entire finding is so general and vague that it amounts to
nothing but an estimate of what the court believes should be
owing from the business operation. In a court of equity, however,
Plaintiff is entitled to an exact accounting which should clarify
in detail the amounts being debited against Plaintiff's account.
Finally, Respondent completely failed to address the argument
that before any personal judgments can be levied against one
partner in favor of another that the partnership assets must
be liquidated.

To allow Mr. Pitcher to unilaterally take all

of the partnership equipment and inventory, to place a zero
value upon the equipment, to claim business losses for which no
proof of payment was ever made, and then to require Plaintiff to
be personally liable to Defendant for this alleged loss is
certainly against all of the traditional principles of partnership liquidation.
For these reasons, therefore, the case should also be
remanded for additional accounting clarification.

POINT III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN COMPUTING THE
ALLEGED AMOUNT OWING BY PLAINTIFF TO
DEFENDANT FOR RENTAL OF DEFENDANT'S
BUILDING AND, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, LACHES
PRECLUDED DEFENDANT FROM RAISING ANY
CLAIM AS TO THE RENTAL OF THE BUILDING
OR THE BASE RADIO STATIONS.
Appellant argued in his opening Brief that the lower court
incorrectly calculated the amount of rental on Defendant's
building for a one-year period.

(Appellant's Brief, p. 18-19).

Respondent contends that while this argument is correctly
based upon Defendant's own statement that such was either a
misstatement or an error in transcription.

(Respondent's Brief,

p. 10) .
Again, it is unclear from the record which date should
apply in this case.

Since Mr. Pitcher was both an employee of

Mr. Sather and an alleged partner the time period referred to
in the testimony cited by Respondent is also ambiguous as to
when the time period began.

Upon remand, it should be a simple

task by using documentary evidence to show the correct period
of time in which Defendant's building (not Plaintiff's building
as is erroneously stated in Respondent's Brief, p. 10) was
utilized by the partnership.
The question of the rental of the radio equipment was
not addressed by Respondent.

Certainly, Plaintiff was entitled

to know at least from the time when Defendant decided to terminate
the partnership that he was being charged for the equipment
which had previously been used in his business operation.
Finally, Respondent has not refuted Plaintiff's claim that
-a-

the doctrine of laches is applicable to this case.

Certainly,

no surprises were presented to either counsel or party in this
case.

Both sides contended that the others failed to act in a

reasonable manner during this time period as to one aspect of
the case or the other.
It is inequitable to allow a claim for rental of Defendant's
building to be made against Plaintiff when no discussion concerning
the amount of rent or that any claim would ever be made had ever
occurred between the parties prior to the lawsuit.

Equally

inequitable is the imposition of rental fees for radio equipment
*when no notice was given that such equipment would be charged at
a normal rental rate.
CONCLUSION
Because of the various ambiguities and errors made by the
lower court in its Findings and Judgment it is only equitable
and just that this matter be remanded for a full hearing so
that an accounting of partnership assets and liabilities may be
made.

It is difficult at this point in time because of the

unclear record to know what the final outcome of such an accounting
would be between the two parties.

However, regardless of the

outcome, Plaintiff is entitled to have a court equitably divide
the business assets and liabilities even though Plaintiff contests
that such a business relationship ever existed.
It is for these reasons, therefore, that the Judgment of
lower court should be reversed and that the case should be
remanded for further proceedings.

DATED this 29th day of July, 1986.
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Attorney for Appellants

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct
copies of the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellants to
Gayle McKeachnie and Clark B. Allred, Attorneys for
Respondents, 363 East Main Street, Vernal, Utah 84078 this
day of July, 1986.

